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Cutting the Baby in Half 
AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE OF INDIVISIBLE 
RESOURCE PARTITION 
INTRODUCTION
The laws of partition1 are inadequate to solve most 
modern co-ownership disputes fairly and efficiently because 
there are only two generally recognized judicial methods of 
partition: partition in kind and partition by sale.2 With 
partition in kind, the resource at issue is physically divided;3
with partition by sale, the resource is sold and the proceeds are 
distributed to the parties.4 Partition thus presumes that all 
property can either be physically divided or sold to effectuate a 
fair distribution. 
However, one vexing partition problem courts and 
scholars have struggled to solve, though have generally 
avoided, is how to partition property that can neither be sold 
nor divided physically.5 Take for instance a situation where two 
1 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 1 (2003) (defining partition as “the dividing of 
lands held by joint tenants, coparceners, or tenants in common, into distinct portions, 
so that they may hold them in severalty” or “any division of real or personal property 
between co-owners, resulting in individual ownership”). 
2 See id. § 2 (“Partition takes two forms: (1) partition in kind . . . and (2) a 
partition by sale . . . .”); 68 C.J.S. Partition § 1 (2009) (“‘Partition’ is a 
division . . . of . . . property . . . effected by the setting apart of [joint] interests so that 
[the owners] can enjoy and possess it in severalty or by a sale of the whole and the 
awarding to each of his or her share of the proceeds.”); WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE
A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.13 (3d ed. 2000) (recognizing “physical division 
or sale and division of proceeds” as the two available methods); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 600 (2005) [hereinafter 
Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property] (“Co-tenancies may be partitioned in two 
ways: either by sale or in kind.”). An overwhelming majority of sources limits the two 
available methods of partition to partition in kind and partition by sale. Among the 
main aims of this article is to show that courts in many jurisdictions also engage in a 
third method of partition: partition by allotment. 
3 See 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 2 (2003) (noting that partition in kind is 
sometimes known as “actual partition”). 
4 See id. (noting that partition by sale is known as “partition by licitation” in 
Louisiana). 
5 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 300 (6th ed. 2006) (posing the question 
and citing In re McDowell, 345 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sur. Ct. 1973)); see also Pugh v. NPC 
Servs., Inc., 721 So. 2d 1056, 1058 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (where, because of hazardous 
waste contamination, the property either had “no value or a negative value,” the court 
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siblings are fighting over ownership of their late grandfather’s 
old rocking chair.6 Using only partition in kind and partition by 
sale, a court cannot adequately resolve the matter.7 This 
struggle to partition indivisible resources underscores one 
manifest limitation of partition. More importantly, however, it 
reveals a fundamental problem with the general approach of 
partition law: the disregard of subjective value. 
In property law, courts generally apply the so-called 
“property rule”: an entitlement can only be removed if the holder 
of the entitlement voluntarily sells it (for a price determined by 
the holder).8 A property rule thereby protects the value that an 
owner subjectively attaches to his property. Conversely in 
partition, owners of concurrent interests are often forced to 
relinquish their entitlement in exchange for the entitlement’s 
objective value.9 In using this “liability rule” courts assume that 
(as in eminent domain) owners cannot set the price they will be 
paid when they are forced to sell their property.10
By using economic principles of game theory, allocations 
in partition can be fairly and efficiently determined from the 
owners’ subjective values, rather than from the objective view of 
the market. This note argues that when fair and efficient to do 
so, courts in partition should protect each co-owner’s entitlement 
by using neither a property rule nor a liability rule, but rather a 
hybrid rule,11 whereby the court would require a co-owner to sell 
his interest at a price determined subjectively by the co-owners 
themselves. So, in two-party indivisible resource partitions, 
asked “[h]ow can property that is susceptible to neither division in kind nor judicial 
sale be partitioned?”). 
6 See generally In re McDowell, 345 N.Y.S.2d 828 (presenting substantially 
similar facts).  
7 See id. at 830; see also Pugh, 721 So. 2d at 1058. 
8 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
9 See id. at 1092. For a discussion of Calabresi and Melamed’s property and 
liability rules in the context of game-theoretic bargaining, see generally Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules Revisited: 
Critical Observations from Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219 (2001). 
10 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1108. 
11 See Lucas J. Asper, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation 
in Eminent Domain: “Just Compensation” or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L.
REV. 489 (2007). In this article, Asper suggests that owners’ subjective evaluation of 
their property should be considered in determining “just compensation” in eminent 
domain cases, instead of simply paying owners the fair market value of their property. 
To do so, Asper suggests “courts should utilize a hybrid rule that makes use of the 
characteristics of both property rules and liability rules.” Id. at 502. However, this 
“hybrid rule” requires courts to balance “all of the factors affecting the property value, 
including subjective values such as sentimental attachment,” rather than have the 
owners themselves set the value of their entitlement. Id.
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courts should eschew both partition in kind and partition by 
sale, and instead allot the entire property to the co-owner who 
values it the most, paying to the other co-owner an amount 
determined by the parties’ subjective evaluation of the property. 
This note analyzes established modes of partition and 
criticizes them for failing to conform to normative economic 
criteria. Following the introduction, Part I will track the 
development of the modern rules of partition in a historical 
context. Part II will outline the normative criteria and 
economic theories necessary to analyze different partition 
methods. Part III will apply these criteria to various methods 
of partition, including popular methods such as chance and 
rotation, as well as the judicial methods of in kind, sale, and 
allotment. Part IV suggests a new method for partitioning 
indivisible resources, referred to here as equitable allotment. 
Finally, this note concludes by discussing unresolved problems 
and encouraging further debate. 
I. HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF PARTITION LAW
Partition is a classic12 problem appearing in many 
contexts13—from disputes as mundane as two children fighting 
over how to divide a cupcake,14 to divorces,15 to corporate 
bankruptcies.16
Perhaps the most celebrated story of partition is the 
biblical tale of King Solomon17 decreeing that a baby—claimed 
12 See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property in 
Three Dimensions, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2008) [hereinafter Bell & 
Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property] (noting that “one of the most basic problems of 
property law” is “what to do when owners of property in common decide to part ways”). 
13 See HERVÉ MOULIN, FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE WELFARE 235 (2003) 
(describing the applicability of fair division to cake-cutting, bankruptcy, divorce, 
inheritance, and dividing disputed territory between countries); see also Michael J. 
Meurer, Fair Division, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 937 & nn.1-6 (1999) (book review) 
(describing the importance of fair division to remedies, probate, family law, partnership 
law, bankruptcy, and other fields). 
14 The cake-cutting problem may seem trivial, but it has occupied 
mathematicians and economists for well over half a century. See, e.g., Lee Anne 
Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1401-02 (2005); Hugo Steinhaus, 
The Problem of Fair Division, 16 ECONOMETRICA 101 (1948).  
15 See, e.g., Jeremy A. Matz, Note, We’re All Winners: Game Theory, the Adjusted 
Winner Procedure and Property Division at Divorce, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1339 (2001) 
(criticizing the applicability of a game-theoretic property division method to divorce cases). 
16 See MOULIN, supra note 13, at 235. 
17 See 1 Kings 3:19-3:28. For a discussion of Solomon’s wisdom in relation to 
fair division see STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, THE WIN-WIN SOLUTION 7-8 
(1999) [hereinafter BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN SOLUTION]; STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN
D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION 6-7 (1996) [hereinafter BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION]; 
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by two women each as her son—be cut in half.18 Solomon, of 
course, did not actually cut the baby in half but instead gave 
him to the woman who had protested the partitioning, 
declaring that she was the boy’s true mother, rather than the 
other woman who seemed satisfied that physically dividing the 
baby was a just method.19 Solomon’s judgment, however, is not 
truly a partitioning scheme20 because Solomon did not intend to 
divide the baby, but sought instead to discern the parties’ 
subjective evaluation of the resource at issue21 and allocate the 
resource to the party that valued it the most.22
Ancient history contains several other treatments of 
partition. The Greek myth of Zeus and Prometheus sharing meat 
describes perhaps the oldest allusion to the divide-and-choose 
method. In that story, Prometheus separated the meat into two 
portions, and Zeus selected his share.23 The Talmud (the 
paramount text of Jewish rabbinic law) discusses a few 
partitioning cases,24 beginning with the famous garment 
problem.25 In this case, where two men grab on to a garment that 
each claims as exclusively his, the Talmud decrees that each be 
given half.26 Roman law allowed for physical division and payment 
Daniel Friedman, From the Trial of Adam and Eve to the Judgments of Solomon and 
Daniel, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 3 (2003) (discussing the wisdom of Solomon among 
other biblical judgments). 
18 See 1 Kings 3:25. 
19 See 1 Kings 3:27. 
20 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN SOLUTION, supra note 17, at 8. 
21 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 6 (explaining that 
Solomon’s solution was really a game to discern the women’s preferences and strategies). 
22 Thus achieving a more efficient distribution. See infra notes 100-01 and 
accompanying text. 
23 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 10. 
24 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, BABA MEZIA 2a (I. Epstein ed., Salis Daiches & 
H. Freedman trans., 1986). Besides the garment problem, the Talmud goes on to 
discuss a similar situation: where “one rides [on an animal] and the other leads it” both 
claiming it as all theirs, each will get half. In a variation, one person holding the 
garment claims “it is all mine” but the other claims “half of it is mine.” Here the 
Talmud decrees the first gets three-quarters, and the other one quarter, on the theory 
that only half of the garment was in dispute, and so only that portion was divided. See
H. PEYTON YOUNG, EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 65 (1994) (discussing this 
Talmudic rule in the context of equality and proportionality). For other Jewish laws of 
partition, see 5 EMANUEL QUINT, A RESTATEMENT OF RABBINIC CIVIL LAW, Part IV 
(Laws of Partition of Realty) (1994). 
25 See BABA MEZIA, supra note 24, at 2a (“Two hold a garment. One of them 
says, ‘I found it,’ and the other says, ‘I found it’; one of them says, ‘it is all mine,’ and 
the other says, ‘it is all mine.’”). 
26 See id.; see also In re Lehal Realty Assoc., 112 B.R. 601, 605 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1990) (referencing the Talmudic garment case); Benjamin Taibleson, 
Forgiving Breach: Understanding the Preference for Damages Over Specific 
Performance, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 541, 570-71 (2009) (discussing the garment 
problem in terms of split-the-difference compromise solutions in hard cases). 
2011] CUTTING THE BABY IN HALF 267
of an owelty.27 But, if the property was not capable of division, the 
Corpus Juris Civilis of Emperor Justinian allowed allotment of 
the entire property to one of the parties.28 English laws of 
partition can be traced at least as far back as Roman law.29
Under the early common law, physical partition was 
greatly limited,30 and partition by “sale was out of [the] question.”31
In medieval England, laws of primogeniture left inheritance to 
the eldest son, and thus made the need for partition infrequent.32
However, the common law limitation had one major exception: 
where all of a decedent’s heirs were female, the law required 
partition.33 The law referred to these heiresses as coparceners, 
precisely because partition was required of them.34
Blackstone briefly discusses partition among coparceners 
and notes that partition occurred either by consent or by 
compulsion.35 Consensual partition included partition in kind, 
where sisters chose parcels in order of seniority, or by random 
chance.36 Blackstone also makes an early reference to the divide-
and-choose method, allowing the eldest sister to divide the land 
and choose the last parcel.37 Compulsory partition, notes 
Blackstone, was had under a writ of partition, whereby the 
sheriff would make a partition of the land on the verdict of a jury 
and assign the parcels to the respective parties.38
Blackstone acknowledges that “there are some things which 
are in their nature impartible,” and so, in situations involving a 
“mansion-house” for instance, Blackstone forbids physical 
partition.39 As an alternative to physical partition, Blackstone 
writes that in these situations “the eldest sister, if she pleases, 
shall have [the property], and make the others a reasonable 
satisfaction.”40 However, if that is not possible, Blackstone holds 
27 See William H. Loyd, Partition, 67 U. PA. L. REV. 162, 163 (1919). 
28 See DIG. 10.2.55 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 2) (S.P. Scott trans., 1932); see also
Loyd, supra note 27, at 163 (referencing the same). 
29 See Loyd, supra note 27, at 163. 
30 See id. at 166. 
31 Id. at 167. 
32 See id. at 164. 
33 See id.
34 See id.
35 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189. 
36 See id.
37 See id. (“[W]here the eldest divides, and then she shall chose last; for the 
rule of law is, cujus est divisio, alterius est election. [She who makes the division has 
the last choice.]” (English translation in original)). 
38 See id.; see also Loyd, supra note 27, at 167 (“[T]he sheriff with a jury of 
twelve went upon the land, made a division of it and allotted the shares.”). 
39 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189-90. 
40 Id.
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that the sisters “shall have the profits of the thing by turns.”41 This 
taking turns—or rotation—was also noted by Sir Edward Coke, 
who wrote that if a mill were to be partitioned, coparceners would 
use it for alternating periods of time.42
With the statute of Henry VIII,43 the right to physical 
partition was greatly expanded. First, partition became 
available to tenants in common and joint tenants, rather than 
just coparceners.44 Second, the right to partition became 
considered absolute,45 and thus, a “court could not refuse it or 
order a sale, although the result might be inconvenient or even 
absurd.”46 For instance, in Turner v. Morgan, the English Court 
of Chancery held that, in a partition of a house, it was not error 
to “allot[] to the Plaintiff the whole stack of chimneys, all the 
fire-places, the only staircase in the house, and all the 
conveniences in the yard.”47
In response to increased urbanization and the 
occasionally ridiculous results of compulsory physical 
partition48 (as in Turner v. Morgan), American states enacted 
legislation allowing courts to sell the property and divide the 
proceeds among the parties.49 Every state now governs partition 
by statute.50 However, under these schemes, statutes in almost51
41 Id.
42 See Loyd, supra note 27, at 167. 
43 See id. at 168-69; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.21 (1952); STOEBUCK 
& WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 5.11. 
44 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 43, § 6.21. Apparently, 
castles “necessary for defence of the realm” were exempted on policy grounds. Turner v. 
Morgan, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 307 (Ch.) 308; 8 Ves. Jun. 143, 144; see also Loyd, supra
note 27, at 167 (noting that unlike halls, which were sometimes physically divided, 
castles used for defense were to remain with the oldest son, his brothers receiving 
payment for their shares). 
45 See Turner, 32 Eng. Rep. at 308; Crocker v. Cotting, 48 N.E. 1023, 1024 
(Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J.) (citing Turner, 32 Eng. Rep. 307); Heldt v. Heldt, 193 N.E.2d 
7, 9 (Ill. 1963) (“[M]otive for partition is immaterial . . . and . . . the absolute right to 
partition yields to no consideration of hardship, inconvenience or difficulty.”); cf. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 18-60-404 (2003) (providing that minority shareholder party not related to 
other co-owners by four degrees of consanguinity cannot petition for partition within 
three years of the purchase of that interest). 
46 Loyd, supra note 27, at 173. 
47 32 Eng. Rep. at 308; see also Scovil v. Kennedy, 14 Conn. 349, 360-61 
(1841) (exhibiting the difficulty in partitioning a stream of water).  
48 See Frank v. Frank, No. 094162, 1992 WL 83533, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 22, 1992) (opining that the Connecticut legislature may have enacted the state’s 
partition statute in response to Scovil, 14 Conn. 349 (partitioning a stream)). 
49 See Wilk v. Wilk, 795 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Vt. 2002). 
50 Plus the District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands. See, e.g., CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 874.010 (Deering 2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-495 (West 
2005); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-21-1 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:56-2. (West 
2000); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 901 (McKinney 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-10 (West 
2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-81 (2007).  
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every jurisdiction still anachronistically52 favor partition in 
kind,53 and allow sale only if physical partition would result in 
“great prejudice”54 or “manifest injury”55 to a party in interest.56
Nevertheless, evidence shows that courts’ loyalty to the 
statutes is only nominal,57 and judges are now more likely to 
order partition by sale despite the stated preference.58 Aside 
from partition in kind and by sale, courts in at least fifteen 
states also participate in a third generally unacknowledged59
method of judicial partition called partition by allotment,60
51 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 1.1201(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (“Property shall be 
partitioned by sale . . . unless a party prays for partition in kind . . . .”); Fannin v. 
Fannin, 75 S.W.2d 1042, 1043 (Ky. 1934) (“[T]he court will presume . . . that a town lot 
is not susceptible of advantageous division.”). Maine statutes do not provide for 
partition by sale. See 14 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 6501-6525 (2003). However, 
Maine courts will allow partition by sale under the court’s equity jurisdiction. See
Libby v. Lorrain, 430 A.2d 37, 39 (Me. 1981). 
52 As early as 1919, William H. Loyd wrote, “American statutes permitting a 
sale when great prejudice would result from a division were passed at a time when 
interests were mainly agricultural and neither legislator nor judge would willingly 
disturb the traditional attitude toward ownership.” Loyd, supra note 27, at 189; see 
also Manel Baucells & Steven A. Lippman, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied: A 
Cooperative Game Theoretic Analysis of Hold-Up in Co-Ownership, 22 CARDOZO L. REV.
1191, 1195 (2001) (“The law ostensibly favors partition in kind for historical 
reasons . . . .”). 
53 See Loyd, supra note 27, at 188; Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 30 
(Conn. 1980); Thomas J. Miceli and C. F. Sirmans, Partition of Real Estate; Or, 
Breaking Up is (Not) Hard to Do, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 183, 787 (2000). 
54 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 38.04 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d Thomas 
ed., 2004).  
55 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 43, § 6.26. 
56 The statutory standard varies by jurisdiction. See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL 
PROPERTY, supra note 53, § 38.04 & nn.108-09; see also John G. Casagrande Jr., Note, 
Acquiring Property Through Forced Partition Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L.
REV. 755, 760 n.47 (1986) (listing each state’s statutory conditions for allowing sale). 
57 See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 5453, § 38.04; UNIF.
PARTITION OF HEIRS PROP. ACT prefatory note (2010), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/utcpa/2010_final.htm [hereinafter UPHPA]
(“Despite the overwhelming statutory preference for partition in kind, courts in a large 
number of states typically resolve partition actions by ordering partition by sale . . . .”); 
see also Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 601 (noting that 
despite the “[r]hetorical[] . . . preference for partition in kind . . . courts have often 
favored tilting the balance toward partition by sale”); Candice Reid, Note, Partitions in 
Kind: A Preference Without Favor, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 855, 856, 864 (1986). 
58 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 43, § 6.26 (writing in 1952 
that “[a]s a practical matter the modern practice is to decree a sale in partition actions 
in the great majority of cases, which usually involve single parcels of improved 
property”); Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a Colored Looking Glass: A View of Judicial 
Partition, Family Land Loss, and Rule Setting, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 753-55 (2000) 
(“[I]n practice . . . partition sales are the rule rather than the exception.”). 
59 See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text. 
60 See infra Part III.E. 
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where the entire property is allotted to one party who pays the 
others an objective amount for their shares.61
Courts still maintain that concurrent owners have an 
“absolute right to partition.”62 Therefore, as with eminent 
domain, the law may force an owner to unwillingly sell his 
property. Indeed, the right is so strong that courts will rarely 
deny partition even when partition would be unduly oppressive 
to a party63 or would displace a family with minor children.64
One author noted that  
although partition actions are brought in equity, the courts have 
been strangely reluctant to deny partition on the basis of [equitable] 
defenses. Attempts to defeat partition by claims of hardship have 
almost always been unsuccessful and frequently have elicited 
statements by the court that the right to partition is absolute.65
In 2010, the National Conference of Commissioners of 
State Laws promulgated the Uniform Partition of Heirs 
Property Act (UPHPA)66 in order to address many of the 
problems associated with forced sale under partition statutes. 
Under the UPHPA, the cotenants who did not request partition 
by sale have the opportunity to buy the shares of those cotenants 
who did request partition67 at a price based on an initial 
appraisal value of the property.68 If the shares of the co-owners 
who requested partition by sale are not all bought-out, the 
UPHPA directs the court to order partition in kind, unless doing 
so would prejudice the cotenants.69 If the court orders partition 
by sale, the UPHPA requires that a real estate broker (paid a 
“reasonable commission”) conduct an open-market sale for a 
61 See generally infra Part III.E. Variations on partition by allotment may 
avoid its characterization as something separate from partition by sale or in kind. For 
instance, in an in kind division with an owelty payment, it is conceivable that the 
property be physically divided into one part containing the entire property and the 
other containing nothing. Furthermore, the winning bidder at a partition sale may be 
one of the co-owners. The sale may also be conducted privately. 
62 Heldt v. Heldt, 193 N.E.2d 7, 9 (Ill. 1963) (explaining that “motive for 
partition is immaterial and that the absolute right to partition yields to no 
consideration of hardship, inconvenience or difficulty” (citations omitted)). 
63 See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 38.03(a)(2)(iii) (citing 
Hassel v. Workman, 260 P.2d 1081 (Okla. 1953) and Condrey v. Condrey, 92 So. 2d 423 
(Fla. 1957) as rare examples of the exception). 
64 See Heldt, 193 N.E.2d at 9; see also 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra
note 54, § 38.03(a)(1) (citing Heldt).
65 Leonard A. Girard, Equitable and Contractual Defenses to Partition, 18 
STAN. L. REV. 1428, 1433 (1966). 
66 UPHPA, supra note 57. 
67 See id. § 7 & accompanying cmts. 
68 See id. § 6. 
69 See id. § 8. 
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value not less than the original appraisal value.70 The UPHPA 
also allows the property to be sold at auction or by sealed bids71
and allows one of the cotenants to be the winning purchaser.72
The UPHPA is limited only to certain types of tenancy in 
common property,73 and has only been adopted by one state.74
Courts have occasionally transferred principles of 
partition to other situations. For instance, in 2001, a dispute 
arose between two baseball fans over Barry Bonds’s record-
setting homerun ball,75 when, after Bonds hit the ball into the 
stands, each litigant claimed he was the ball’s true owner.76 In 
Popov v. Hayashi, the court decided that both parties had “an 
equal and undivided interest in the ball.”77 By recognizing each 
litigant’s concurrent property interest, the court, in effect, 
deemed the two litigants co-owners78 of the ball, before ordering 
the ball sold and the proceeds divided evenly between them.79
II. NORMATIVE CRITERIA FOR AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
PARTITION80
This section establishes the tools necessary for an 
economic analysis of partition. However, it is difficult—if not 
impossible—for any popular or judicial scheme to conform to all 
70 See id. § 10(a)-(b). 
71 See id. § 10(a). 
72 See id. § 10(f). Statutes in Utah and Washington expressly contemplate one 
of the co-owners purchasing the property. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-1235 
(LexisNexis 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.52.390 (West 2007). 
73 See UPHPA, supra note 57, § 2. 
74 As this note goes to press, only Nevada has adopted the UPHPA. See Acts: 
Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=Partition%20of%20Heirs%20Property%20Act (last visited Nov. 22, 2011). 
75 See Popov v. Hayashi, No. 400545, 2002 WL 31833731, at *1-2 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 18, 2002). For a discussion of Popov v. Hayashi, as well as the Talmudic 
garment division principle in the context of split-the-difference remedies, see Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman & Steve Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and Half Rights, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 738 (2007). 
76 See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *2-3. 
77 Id. at *8 (“[W]here more than one party has a valid claim to a single piece 
of property, the court will recognize an undivided interest in the property in proportion 
to the strength of the claim.”). 
78 Under this formulation the co-owners would be tenants in common. See
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 275. 
79 See Popov, 2002 WL 31833731, at *8. 
80 For a critique of the use of mathematical criteria of fairness in real-world 
bargaining problems, see Robert J. Condlin, Every Day and in Every Way We Are All 
Becoming Meta and Meta, or How Communitarian Bargaining Theory Conquered the 
World (of Bargaining Theory), 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 231, 267-69 (2008), which 
argues that bargaining algorithms using mathematical notions of equity and fairness 
have inherent limitations in incorporating complex notions of cultural and moral norms. 
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of these principles, and sometimes the presence of one may 
preclude the presence of another. When scrutinizing a 
particular method of partition, it is not enough that the scheme 
sometimes results in a fair or efficient allocation. Rather, the 
application of these criteria questions whether the mechanism 
guarantees a particular result. Moreover, the qualities outlined 
in this checklist may carry different persuasive weight among 
concurrent owners, courts, economists, and society at large. As 
a whole, the focus should be both on the fairness of the outcome 
as well as the method itself.  
A. Proportionality  
Proportionality embodies the essence of fair division. An 
allocation is proportional for n parties with equal interests if 
each party feels it received at least 1/n of the resource.81
Therefore, dividing a pie between two children is proportional if 
each child feels she received one-half of the pie. However, if Alice 
contributes $10 and Ben contributes $5 towards the purchase of 
a $15 pie, fairness dictates that Alice receive at least twice as 
much pie as Ben.82 This conforms to the Aristotelian doctrine 
that “[e]quals should be treated equally, and unequals 
unequally, in proportion to relevant similarities and 
differences.”83 This seems intuitive, but when faced with difficult 
cases, resorting to arbitrary factors—such as age or gender—
may be easier, but less fair, than proportional division. 
B. Envy-Freeness 
Envy-freeness conceptualizes the emotional 
underpinnings of unfairness into a rational84 and compelling 
test.85 According to one author, “A distribution is said to be 
envy-free if no one prefers another’s portion to his own.”86 After 
81 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 9 & n.8. 
82 Presuming that twice as much pie is worth twice as much. 
83 MOULIN, supra note 13, at 1 (citing Aristotle’s NICOMACHEAN ETHICS). 
84 The underlying assumption is that the parties each rationally want to gain 
as much value as possible from the allocation. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 9, at 
228 (“The standard economic game-theoretic prediction is that both players will behave 
rationally, that is to say, strive to maximize their monetary payoffs.”). 
85 See MOULIN, supra note 13, at 235 (“With heterogeneous individual 
preferences . . . [t]he test of no envy . . . offers an extremely appealing answer.”). 
86 YOUNG, supra note 24, at 11 (emphasis omitted); accord MOULIN, supra
note 13, at 236 (“A distribution of resources is nonenvious, or it passes the no-envy test, 
if every agent prefers (weakly) his or her share to that of any other agent: I cannot 
complain about my share because no one else has a share that I would exchange for 
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an envy-free distribution, each party feels he received the most 
valuable portion,87 or a portion at least as valuable as anyone 
else’s portion. On the other hand, if after partitioning the 
resource, one party values another’s share more highly than his 
own, the partition fails the envy-free test.88 Thus, the envy-free 
test requires consideration of each party’s subjective valuation. 
C. Efficiency  
Concurrent ownership generally encourages inefficient 
use of property.89 If too many people hold the right to use the 
property, each user may not be able to internalize the 
consequences (externalities) of his use, which produces 
inefficient consumption—a situation called the “tragedy of the 
commons.”90 On the other hand, when there are too many 
owners, each with the ability to block the others’ use, the result 
is likewise inefficient because by threatening a block, each 
owner may extract a premium91 from the other owners—a 
mine.”). The philosophical origins of the no-envy test are uncertain, but can be traced 
to the work of Ronald Dworkin and earlier. See Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? 
Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283, 285 (1981); Carol Necole 
Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Property Allocation,
53 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 104-05 (2005) (noting that “Harrington’s Law is that no division is 
just if, after the division, any one participant would prefer the portion allocated to 
another participant” and citing THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON (J.G.A. 
Pocock ed., 1977)). 
87 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 2. 
88 See EDWARD E. ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS 97 (1995). 
89 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 291; see also Ian Ayres & Eric 
Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing Legal Entitlements to Facilitate Cosean Trade,
104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1096-98 (1995); Bell & Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property,
supra note 12, at 1021. Bell and Parchomovsky argue that 
[W]here the owner is unable to extract the full social value inherent in 
property ownership and is therefore likely to maintain the asset in a 
suboptimal configuration . . . [forced aggregation and disaggregation 
doctrines, including partition by sale] seek to force the property into the 
optimal asset configuration without compromising the drive toward a single 
owner, while minimizing the negative impact on owner dominion. 
Id. at 1049. 
90 See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549, 551 (2001); see also Ayres & Talley, supra note 89, at 1029. 
91 See Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After 
Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1999). After 
examining several nuisance suits, Farnsworth concludes that despite what Coase or 
Calabresi and Melamed may suggest, parties do not continue to negotiate after 
judgment. Id. at 373-74. Instead, winners will not sell their rights unless paid an 
astronomical amount—dubbed an “acrimony” or “commensurability premium.” Id. at 
392. This illustrates how protecting an unwilling seller with a property rule can result 
in an anticommons block to efficient use. 
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situation known as the “tragedy of the anticommons.”92 By 
ending co-ownership, partition encourages efficiency; however, 
the methods of partition themselves are often inefficient. 
Efficiency has various definitions,93 but this discussion will 
use “efficient” to mean “Pareto-optimal.” According to one leading 
economist, “Pareto optimality is the single most important tool of 
normative economic analysis. Its desirability is undisputed. In the 
endstate version of distributive justice, it is the one requirement 
that cannot be dispensed with.”94 An allocation is Pareto-optimal if 
there exists no other feasible allocation that can make one party 
better-off while keeping all other parties at least as well-off.95 In 
other words, a situation is inefficient if it is possible to make a 
party better without making anyone else worse.96 So if Harry has 
three gloves but Lloyd only has one glove, the distribution is 
inefficient because taking away Harry’s extra glove and giving it 
to Lloyd keeps Lloyd warm without making Harry cold. On the 
other hand, if Harry has two gloves and Lloyd has only one, the 
distribution is efficient because the only way to make Lloyd better 
is to make Harry worse.  
After an envy-free distribution, simply because each 
party is unwilling to switch shares with anyone else does not 
mean that everyone received the largest share possible.97 In 
other words, an envy-free allocation is not necessarily 
efficient.98 However, as one economist wrote, “A nonenvious 
distribution that is also efficient is one coherent answer to the 
fair division puzzle.”99
Fitness is an aspect of efficiency that mandates giving 
“the resources to whomever makes the best use of it: the flute 
92 See Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 564; see also
Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53, at 783, 787 (but noting, also, that “[c]ommon 
ownership can promote efficient use of land”). 
93 See ZAJAC, supra note 88, at 11-12. 
94 MOULIN, supra note 13, at 8. But see ZAJAC, supra note 88, at 69 
(“[E]conomic efficiency is a necessary but far from sufficient condition for an 
economically just or fair economy.”). 
95 See B. Lockwood, Pareto Efficiency, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS 811, 811 (Eatwell et al. eds., 1987). Note that in considering a Pareto-
superior position we look only at the allocation to the parties involved. So, an allocation 
that leaves all parties better off, but dispenses with the need for attorneys, is 
considered more efficient even though the lawyer counting on a big paycheck is now 
unhappy. See infra Part II.D. 
96 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 44. 
97 See id. at 2. 
98 See id. at 2 n.2. 
99 MOULIN, supra note 13, at 236. 
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to the flutist, [and] the books to the avid reader.”100 The utility a 
party derives from an allocation is discernable from how much 
that party values the allocation. Therefore, a child who likes 
pie will value a slice of pie more than he will value a torts 
casebook, because he can derive greater utility from the pie 
than from the casebook. Therefore, efficiency dictates allocating 
a resource to whichever party values it most.101
D. Administrability  
While not conceptually distinct from Pareto-superiority,102
administrability emphasizes efficiency in method as well as 
result. It is incontrovertible that partition schemes should be easy 
to administer, costing the courts and the parties as little time and 
effort as possible. Ideally, the parties themselves should be able to 
achieve the partition cheaply and easily without the need of a 
third-party mediator (such as the courts).103 However, in every 
jurisdiction,104 partition requires peripheral entities—such as 
auctioneers,105 appraisers,106 panels of commissioners or referees,107
100 Id. at 2. Gauging utility often involves social judgments. Do farmers make 
“better use” of a field than do football players? Is it better to give the flute to the flutist 
if no one likes hearing her play? This note will ignore externalities and assume that the 
party who values the resource the most derives the greatest utility from it. Eschewing 
social judgment may prove unworkable if society prefers one use over another more 
profitable use, as in a situation where a young girl’s cherished pet horse may be 
another’s prizewinner. In this note, utility will be purely subjective. 
101 See Fennell, supra note 14, at 1403 (“From an efficiency perspective, we 
would want the entitlement to end up in the hands of the party who values it the 
most—whether or not the entitlement was originally assigned to that party.”); James 
E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in 
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 446 (1995) (“From the standpoint of efficiency, a 
judge should . . . assign the entitlement . . . such that it ends up in the hands of that 
party . . . who values it most (or can do without it at least cost). From the standpoint of 
justice, the judge should assign the entitlement such that it starts out in the hands of 
the party who is most deserving in light of the applicable justice norm . . . .”). 
102 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1093-95 (“[A]dministrative 
efficiency is just one aspect of the broader concept of economic efficiency.”). Pareto-
superior means more efficient, or closer to Pareto-optimal. 
103 This discussion only contemplates the benefits to the parties, so any loss in 
revenue for auctioneers, appraisers, commissioners, and lawyers is not considered. 
104 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 874.010 (West 1980) (“The costs of 
partition include [inter alia]: . . . attorney’s fees . . . fee and expenses of the 
referee . . . compensation . . . for services of a surveyor or other person employed by the 
referee . . .  [and] costs of a title report . . . .”). 
105 See Miller v. Burke, 68 N.Y. 615, 615 (1877) (auctioneer recovering auction 
fees from partition sale); Anderson v. Anderson, No. A-01-418, 2002 Neb. App. LEXIS 
180 (Neb. Ct. App. July 2, 2002) (reasonableness of auction fees as a percentage of sale 
price in partition sale). 
106 See Geib v. McKinney, 617 A.2d 1377 (Conn. 1992). 
107 See Girard, supra note 65, at 1429-30. 
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surveyors, and of course, attorneys108—whose costs all eat away at 
the parties’ final allocations.109 A method of partition that 
eliminates these costs will result in Pareto-superiority because 
each party will receive a greater allocation without the deduction 
of these extra expenses.110
E. Equitability  
Even in situations where all the parties feel they 
received more than their fair share, the amount by which they 
feel they received more than their fair share may differ. 
Equitability ensures that each party’s surplus (the value 
exceeding the proportional share) is equal. So if Alice feels she 
got 51 percent of the pie, but Ben feels he got 91 percent of the 
pie, the allocation is not equitable. For a more concrete 
example, imagine that Alice loves boats but hates airplanes, 
and Ben loves airplanes but hates boats. If Alice is given a toy 
boat, but Ben is given an actual Harrier jet, the allocation will 
be envy-free because neither party will want to switch places 
with the other.111 However, although Alice is happy with her 
boat, Ben is much happier with his jet, and therefore the 
allocation is not equitable. A fair method of partition ensures 
equitability.  
F. Strategy-Proofness 
Any method susceptible to gamesmanship does not 
guarantee fair results.112 Therefore, a fair partition method must 
ensure that it is not in any player’s best interest to lie.113 If an 
allocation method is strategy-proof then “truthful report is a 
dominant strategy.”114 This occurs if the party making the 
108 See Clement v. Ferguson, 287 P.2d 207, 213-14 (Okla. 1955). 
109 See id.
110 See discussion under “Efficiency,” supra Part II.C. 
111 Presuming the jet cannot be sold to buy many toy boats. 
112 See MOULIN, supra note 13, at 237 (noting the importance of 
“strategyproofness” in nonenvious assignments); see also Fennell, supra note 14, at 
1401-02 (noting in a game-theoretic discussion of Calabresi-Melamed entitlements that 
the “challenge, then, is to structure legal entitlements in a way that induces people to 
truthfully reveal their valuations”); Ayres & Talley, supra note 89, at 1030 (noting that 
“self-interested bargainers have a strong incentive to misrepresent their private 
valuations so as to capture a larger share of the bargaining ‘pie’” and developing a 
scheme to facilitate trade by eliminating this incentive). 
113 See MOULIN, supra note 13, at 237 (noting that when honesty was the 
dominant strategy, the assignment was strategy-proof). 
114 Vito Fragnelli & Maria Erminia Marina, Strategic Manipulations and 
Collusions in Knaster Procedure, 3 AUCO CZECH ECON. REV. 143, 144 (2009). 
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evaluation either knows that lying will be disadvantageous115 or 
does not know whether fixing a high or low evaluation will be to 
her advantage.116 Therefore, a strategy-proof method 
disincentivizes both high and low valuations.117 Consonant with 
the criterion of strategy-proofness is the requirement that the 
method be impervious to collusion. In other words, it should also 
not be possible for two or more players to better their positions 
by furtively agreeing to collaborate.118 Much of game theory fair 
division is devoted to concocting strategy-proofing mechanisms. 
III. TESTING PARTITION SCHEMES FOR FAIRNESS AND 
EFFICIENCY
This section analyzes several methods of partition using 
the criteria established in Part II. Although these are not 
nearly the only modes of partition, they represent an array of 
schemes most likely to impact the rights of co-owners.119
A. Partition in Kind 
It is axiomatic that one cannot physically divide an 
indivisible resource. Although most modern partition actions 
involve indivisible property, statutes in nearly120 every 
jurisdiction prefer partition in kind.121 In practice however, 
courts are likely to allow sale “where the . . . fragmentation 
[resulting from physical division] would materially reduce the 
115 Consider a rule that allows homeowners to set the value of their property 
for tax purposes and for eminent domain purposes. Clearly, for property tax purposes, 
owners would gain by setting a price much lower than their true valuation of the 
property. Similarly, if homeowners were allowed to set the “just compensation” value of 
their home after it was taken through eminent domain, owners would quote a price 
much higher than their true valuation of the property. If strategy-proof, it would be in 
the owner’s best interest to tell the truth about the property’s value. 
116 See Fennell, supra note 14, at 1411, 1418-19 (citing John Rawls’s “veil of 
ignorance” as an antidote to self-interest bargaining). 
117 See id. at 1411. 
118 See Fragnelli & Marina, supra note 114, at 144 (quoting Moulin’s definition 
of coalition-strategy-proof as “when ‘if a joint misreport by a coalition strictly benefits 
one member of the coalition, it must strictly hurt at least one (other) member’”). 
119 The several modes of partition discussed primarily by economists, which 
have gained little if any attention by the courts or legal academics, are best handled in 
a separate treatment. See Matz, supra note 15.  
120 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 1.1201(2) (West 2002) (“Property shall be 
partitioned by sale . . . unless a party prays for partition in kind . . . .”); Fannin v. 
Fannin, 75 S.W.2d 1042, 1043 (Ky. 1934) (“[T]he court will presume . . . that a town lot 
is not susceptible of advantageous division.”). 
121 See Loyd, supra note 27, at 188; Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 
1980); Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53, at 784. 
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aggregate value of the [property].”122 Thus, “indivisible” does not 
mean “incapable of division,” but rather that partition in kind 
would reduce the total value of the resource.123 A six-karat 
diamond that can be cut into two three-karat diamonds is 
therefore considered indivisible because as the karat of a single 
diamond increases its price per karat also increases.124
Moreover, because of removal and disposal costs, physically 
partitioning a boat, for example, may leave the parties even 
worse off than if they had received nothing at all.125 Even if the 
aggregate value of the divided parcels were not reduced, but 
remained exactly equal to the value of the undivided property, 
the high transaction costs associated with partition126 means 
that a partition in kind scheme would result in a Pareto-
inferior distribution. 
Despite the imprudence of physical division, courts 
presented with an indivisible resource may order partition in 
kind to encourage an out-of-court settlement. For instance, the 
court in Turner v. Morgan sanctioned physically partitioning a 
house hoping the parties would “agree to buy and sell” each 
other’s shares.127 Yet such a ruling results in an anticommons 
situation where each party may block the other’s use and 
extract hold-up costs in excess of their fair share.128 Thus in a 
world with transaction costs, courts that use a property rule by 
ordering partition in kind encourage inefficiency.129
On the other hand, “where there are no scale economies 
[meaning that] the aggregate market value of the [property] 
when subdivided . . . is no less than the value of the undivided 
parcel . . . partition in kind is always the efficient remedy.”130 So 
122 Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53, at 796. Here the authors provide a 
balancing test for determining when courts should order sale and when they should 
partition in kind, considering the goals of maximizing the aggregate value of the land 
and protecting subjective value. Id. at 783; see also Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of 
Property, supra note 2, at 601 (“[C]ourts have often favored tilting the balance toward 
partition by sale . . . by collapsing the two-part test for partition in kind into a one-step 
inquiry into whether value would be lost by opting for partition in kind.”). 
123 See Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 601-02. 
124 In other words, a six-karat diamond is worth more than twice as much as a 
three-karat diamond. Similarly, the value of a living baby is worth much more than 
twice the value of half a baby.  
125 See Arthur L. Stinchcombe, The Economic Analysis of Law: Game Theory, 
Procedure, and Consent: Focusing on Fair Division, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1087, 1092 (1997). 
126 See “Administrability,” supra Part II.D. 
127 Turner v. Morgan, (1803) 32 Eng. Rep. 307 (Ch.) 308; 8 Ves. Jun. 143, 145. 
128 See Baucells & Lippman, supra note 52, at 1195. 
129 See Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53, at 787-88. 
130 Id. at 788-89. Except when transaction costs are high. See supra Part II.D. 
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for instance, a giant bluefin tuna (which can top $300,000131) may 
be physically partitioned. Because such resources are easy to 
divide, this note will focus exclusively on indivisible property. 
B. Chance  
Chance has a long history in fair division.132 Some courts 
have accepted randomness in resource allocation,133 while others 
have no tolerance for arbitrariness.134 In the context of partition, 
after real property has been divided into parcels pursuant to a 
partition in kind, assignment of the parcels by lottery is 
acceptable135 and may even be provided for by statute.136
Although the use of chance has many appealing qualities, 
it is not a fair method of partition. At first blush, a coin flip seems 
to provide a simple, impartial,137 and strategy-proof138 method for 
allocating disputed resources: it requires no mediator, and the 
only cost is acquiring the coin. The winner-take-all outcome of 
coin flipping is also efficient139 because making the loser happier 
requires taking value away from the winner. 
Chance appears fair only when the parties view the 
value of the resource at issue as equivalent to the probability of 
obtaining the disputed property. If the undivided chance of 
131 See Akiko Fujita, A Real Fish Story: Bluefin Tuna Is Auctioned for Record 
$396,000, ABC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/International/bluefin-tuna-
fetches-record-396000-japanese-fish-market/story?id=12544594 (describing a tuna 
bought jointly by two restaurant owners from different cities). 
132 See Jonah 1:7 (“So they cast lots, and the lot fell upon Jonah.”). 
133 See Brown, supra note 86, at 65, 66-74 (discussing the history, legality, and 
efficacy of distribution and allocation of resources by chance); see also Adam H. 
Samaha, Randomization in Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2009) (finding a 
proper place for random decision making in American jurisprudence). 
134 See Wilk v. Wilk, 795 A.2d 1192, 1195 (Vt. 2002) (in dicta, explaining that 
where there is no basis for allotting property to one party over another, a court should 
resort to sale rather than abuse its discretion by making an arbitrary decision); see also
Ayres & Talley, supra note 89, at 1078 (explaining that “the legal system’s use of 
analogy and precedent is inconsistent with a decision-making process that ultimately 
resembles a flip of a coin”). 
135 See Townbridge v. Donner, 40 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Neb. 1950) (referee may 
allot partitioned portions, or parties may draw lots); Gray v. Von Crotts, 293 S.E.2d 
626, 629 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189 
(coparceners distribute parcels by lots); see also Jay M. Zitter, Judicial Partition of 
Land by Lot or Chance, 32 A.L.R. 4th 909, 909-15 (West 1984) (collecting cases 
requiring or allowing parcels to be distributed by chance pursuant to a partition in 
kind). 
136 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-21-21 (West 2008). 
137 See Brown, supra note 86, at 113. 
138 That is, presuming the coin is fair, and both parties can see the coin being 
flipped and landing. 
139 See Brown, supra note 86, at 113. 
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obtaining the resource is 1, and there are n parties with equal 
interests, then a decision that gives each party an equal 1/n
chance of winning at first seems proportional. However, the 
resource at issue is not a probability, but the actual underlying 
property. Thus, the allocation of the property after the coin-flip 
is not proportional, envy-free, or equitable, because the winner 
of the toss gets the entire allocation, whereas the loser receives 
nothing.  
C. Rotation  
Rotation describes the concept of taking turns,140
examples of which are ubiquitous.141 Roommates take turns 
doing the dishes and divorced spouses take turns with custody 
of children.142 When two motorists converge at an intersection 
and both have the right to use the road (although they cannot 
both safely do so at the same time), the traffic light divides the 
resource temporally by giving one party the use of the road now 
and the other party the use of the road later. 
As a judicial method of partition, rotation has gained 
intermittent support. Blackstone143 and Coke144 wrote that in 
circumstances where property, such as a house or mill, cannot 
be partitioned physically, the co-owners could take turns using 
and profiting from the resource. A Minnesota statute similarly 
provides: “When the premises consist of a mill or other 
tenement which cannot be divided . . . the referees may assign 
the exclusive occupancy and enjoyment . . . to each of the 
parties alternately for specified times, in proportion to their 
respective interests.”145
140 See YOUNG, supra note 24, at 21 (using the term “rotation” to describe 
alternating time-sharing). 
141 For a fictional and humorous example of rotation, see The Simpsons: Three 
Men and a Comic Book (FOX television broadcast May 9, 1991) (Bart, Millhouse, and 
Martin contribute to buy an expensive comic book and agree that Bart will have 
possession Mondays and Thursdays, Millhouse Tuesdays and Fridays, and Martin 
Wednesdays and Saturdays, while Sunday’s possession will be determined by a random 
number generator.). 
142 See YOUNG, supra note 24, at 21, 34. 
143 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *189-90 (“[T]hey shall have 
the profits of the thing by turns . . . .”). 
144 See Loyd, supra note 27, at 167 (alternating use of a mill). 
145 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 558.12 (West 2010). Maine has a similar statute. 14 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6506 (West 2003) (“Tenants in common of a sawmill may have a 
division of the time during which each may occupy according to his interest . . . .”). 
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One notable case of partition by rotation is In re 
McDowell.146 In this probate case, a brother and sister claimed 
rights to their late grandfather’s rocking chair, which had great 
sentimental value to the parties but “only nominal” value 
otherwise.147 While admitting that his ruling “may sound 
strange,”148 the judge ordered that each sibling have possession 
of the chair for alternating six-month intervals, with the 
survivor to take exclusive ownership.149
The court’s solution in this case is analogous to a 
partition in kind, except here the court divided the chair 
temporally instead of physically. Likewise, just as if the chair 
had been sawed in two, the division of the chair in time 
substantially decreases the aggregate value of the chair.150 Just 
as twice the value of a physical half of a chair is worth less 
than the value of the whole chair intact, twice the value of each 
sibling’s temporal allotment is worth less than the value of the 
undivided chair.151 In other words, the decision to divide the 
ownership of the chair in time leaves each sibling with much 
less than half the actual value of the chair. This allocation is 
not Pareto-optimal because other allocations exist that can 
leave both parties happier. 
In a McDowell scenario, rotation adds additional 
inefficiency because the expense incurred in transporting the 
chair back and forth between the siblings’ houses wastes 
resources that could otherwise be used more effectively. While 
in and out of possession, the chair cannot be put to its maximal 
productive use—which may include something as simple as 
tying a room together, or as significant as its utility as a 
cherished heirloom. Furthermore, the party out of possession 
will have to buy another chair to take the rocking chair’s place 
146 345 N.Y.S.2d 828 (Sur. Ct. 1973). 
147 Id. at 830. 
148 Id. One author wrote of the McDowell decision: “The court could, I suppose, 
have adopted the judgment of Solomon and required the chair be cut in two. Instead the 
judge . . . ordered that the two children should be permitted to take the chair for six 
month turns . . . .” Robert Pearce, What Kind of Castle?, 7 DENNING L.J. 153, 164 (1992). 
149 See In re McDowell, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 830. According to Abraham Bell and 
Gideon Parchomovsky, by recognizing that the siblings co-owned the chair and 
ordering rotation, “the court rejected the traditional owner-oriented [partition in kind] 
and asset oriented [partition by sale] resolutions of partition problems and instead 
invented one oriented toward dominion through forced time-sharing.” Bell & 
Parchomovsky, Reconfiguring Property, supra note 12, at 1021 (analyzing property in 
the dimensions of “owner,” “asset,” and “dominion”). 
150 See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
151 Consider how much you would pay to rent an apartment for a year, and compare 
it to how much you would pay to rent the same apartment every other day for two years. 
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in its absence, and incur the expense of storing the superfluous 
chair while back in possession. A Pareto-superior distribution 
would eliminate these added costs, giving each party a greater 
allocation. Because of these costs, the siblings will have an 
incentive to resolve their dispute out of court,152 since the 
sibling with less resources will either simply give up 
transporting the chair after a few turns, or will settle for an 
unfairly small amount. 
For resources susceptible to waste, rotation leads to 
inefficiency by encouraging earlier users to maximize their own 
utility early lest there be nothing left when their time comes 
again.153 If two mining companies take turns with a parcel of 
mineral-rich land, each company will want to mine as much ore 
as possible—even more ore than they need—before their tenure 
ends. Of course, rotation does not apply to resources that are 
destroyed when used, such as a single piece of candy.  
A central problem arises when adjudicators must decide 
who starts first—or more specifically—which time period to allot 
to which party. In the McDowell decree, the sister took the chair 
every July through December. If the brother preferred using the 
chair during autumn, he feels unhappy that he may only have the 
chair from January to June. If the sister dreamed of rocking on 
her porch in spring, she will likewise be upset at her allotment.154
Even if the time allotments are substantially similar, 
the problem becomes who goes first and who goes second. 
Scholarship suggests that people overwhelmingly value 
obtaining a resource now more than they value obtaining the 
same resource at some point in the future.155 A person’s 
intertemporal choice may, in part, be psychologically 
152 The McDowell Court contemplated the parties ending the arrangement 
voluntarily. 345 N.Y.S.2d at 830. Although not saying so, the judge may even have 
intended this outcome. 
153 See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. 
154 If the parties’ preferences are exactly opposite of their allotment then the 
distribution is clearly inefficient. However, it would be a simple matter of switching the 
dates to effectuate a Pareto-superior allocation. Ronald Coase argues that regardless of 
the initial allocation of entitlements, in the absence of transaction costs, parties will 
themselves bargain for an efficient distribution. See generally Ronald H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Though, in a family feud, acrimony 
may prevent frictionless bargaining. See Farnsworth, supra note 91. 
155 See Dilip Soman et al., The Psychology of Intertemporal Discounting: Why Are 
Distant Events Valued Differently from Proximal Ones?, 16 MARKETING LETTERS 347 (2005), 
available at http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/shanefrederick/Marketing%20Letters.pdf (last 
visited July 27, 2011). Money is of course more valuable today than it is in a year, so 
future money must first be discounted before it is compared to present money. See
Arden Rowell, The Cost of Time: Haphazard Discounting and the Undervaluation of 
Regulatory Benefits, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1505, 1512 (2010). 
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motivated,156 or it may be a rational economic decision.157
Economists agree that temporal discounting plays a 
fundamental role in evaluating outcomes, even with 
nonmonetary resources.158 Abe will therefore prefer to be the 
first to try the new game, but will want to hold off cleaning the 
dishes, and it will be economically rational for him to do so. 
Thus under either an objective or a subjective test of 
evaluation, the first taker in rotation gains a larger share of 
the allocation than do subsequent players. So without 
adjusting159 the shares by discounting the allocation to 
subsequent parties160 the rotation method fails envy-freeness 
and proportionality.  
D. Partition by Sale 
Because most partition actions today involve houses and 
other developed land, courts in practice usually order partition 
by sale,161 despite the stated preference for partition in kind.162
In some jurisdictions sale is now the preferred method,163 and 
many scholars have praised the de facto shift to a preference in 
156 See Soman et al., supra note 155, at 351-52 (accounting for factors such as 
self-control and delayed gratification). 
157 See id. at 356. 
158 That is, even for resources that cannot be invested, and do not succumb to 
inflation or depreciation (such as eating candy now versus being overweight later, 
getting a massage now versus getting a massage later). See Shane Frederick, George 
Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical 
Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351 (2002), available at http://www.jstor.org/ 
stable/2698382. 
159 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, WIN-WIN SOLUTION, supra note 17, at 38-39. The 
authors contrast strict alternation, where players take turns choosing one of many items 
to be distributed, to balanced alternation, compensating subsequent choosers for not 
choosing earlier. Strict and balanced alternation work when many distinct resources 
must be divided, as when basketball teams take turns drafting players. See id. at 27. If 
one or few items are at issue, strict and balanced alternation are inapplicable. 
160 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 89, at 1080-81. Here, authors Ayres and 
Talley temporally divide ownership of real property into an initial term of years to one 
party, with the remainder to the other party in fee simple. Using a discount rate of 10 
percent, they calculate that the parties “should be indifferent between receiving a claim 
to the first 6.93 years or receiving a claim to all subsequent years (in perpetuity).” Id.
161 See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 43, § 6.26 (writing in 1952 
that “[a]s a practical matter the modern practice is to decree a sale . . . in the great 
majority of cases, which usually involve single parcels of improved property”).  
162 See Loyd, supra note 27, at 188; Delfino v. Vealencis, 436 A.2d 27, 30 
(Conn. 1980); Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53, at 787. 
163 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 1.1201(2) (West 2002) (“Property shall be 
partitioned by sale . . . unless a party prays for partition in kind . . . .”); Fannin v. 
Fannin, 75 S.W.2d 1042, 1043 (Ky. 1934) (“[T]he court will presume . . . that a town lot 
is not susceptible of advantageous division . . . .”). 
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favor of sale.164 Most of this academic praise, however, is 
warranted only as a preference for sale as the better 
alternative to physical division. However, when partition by 
sale is examined independently, rather than as the better 
alternative to partition in kind, several problems emerge. First, 
forced sale does not adequately compensate owners for the 
subjective value of their property. This is particularly 
problematic if the property has purely sentimental value. 
Second, forced sale may work hardship by dispossessing people 
of their homes or ancestral land. Finally, the many 
shortcomings of auctions and other methods of judicial sale 
result in unfair allocations. 
1. Protecting Subjective Value 
Generally, people cannot be forced to sell their property, 
but rather may decide whether to sell their property and how 
much they must get in return for doing so.165 Yet in partition by 
sale, owners are forced to sell their property interests, and do 
not get to decide their compensation for doing so. Instead, 
partition by sale protects concurrent owners’ interests with a 
liability rule166: the owner is forced to relinquish the entitlement 
in exchange for the entitlement’s objective value.167 In partition 
actions, an appraiser, panel of commissioners, or the will of the 
free market by sale at public auction determines the property’s 
objective, or “market,” value. However, owners are often 
unwilling168 to part with their property at market value, and 
instead will subjectively evaluate their property at a price 
164 See, e.g., Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53 (indicating the courts’ preference 
for sale conforms to their standard); Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra
note 2, at 601 (noting that in consonance with the article’s value theory of property, by 
favoring partition by sale “courts have reached precisely the right result”); see also
Reid, supra note 57, at 856 (suggesting that “courts promote economic efficiency when 
they favor judicial sales”). 
165 See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8 (discussing the protection 
of such entitlements with a property rule). 
166 See Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53, at 784, 789-90. 
167 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8. In eminent domain cases, it is 
generally held that “the condemnee is entitled to market value based on what the appraiser 
determines to be the highest or best use of the property . . . not merely the market value 
based on the condition of the property at that time.” Asper, supra note 11, at 498. 
168 That is, if their entitlement is protected with a property rule, giving them 
the option of retaining the entitlement or voluntarily relinquishing the entitlement for 
whatever compensation they feel adequate. If protected by a liability rule, the 
unwilling owner may be forced to part with his property for an objective price. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 8, at 1108 (“Taney may be sentimentally attached to 
his land. As a result, eminent domain [using a liability rule] may grossly undervalue 
what Taney would actually sell for.”). 
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much higher than market value. In fact, a substantial gap 
often exists between a unique object’s market and reserve 
prices.169 Thus, a liability rule undercompensates owners by the 
amount that the owner’s subjective valuation of the 
entitlement exceeds its objective value.170
The McDowell rocking chair scenario confounded the 
court because the court believed it could not sell a chair with no 
market value.171 The true problem, however, was not the chair’s 
lack of market value, but rather that the chair’s sentimental 
value outweighed its market value. Because an owner’s 
subjective valuation will often exceed the property’s fair 
market value, courts should analyze most partition actions—
even of a multimillion-dollar home—the same way as that of an 
old rocking chair. 
There are several reasons why subjective value will be 
greater than objective value. First, sentimental value creates 
“emotional utility” for the owner that is not accounted for in the 
market price.172 Whereas an old clock only holds intrinsic utility 
to the market (as just an old clock), to an owner with 
sentimental attachment to the property the clock has both the 
utility of an old clock plus its additional value as a family 
heirloom. Second, a quality known as delight in ownership 
describes the utility derived from the ownership rather than 
from the value of the item. In other words, this additional value 
results not from the worth of an object, but simply from the 
satisfaction in owning it.173
Delight in ownership is related to, but distinct from, 
another concept called the endowment effect, which describes 
an irrational174 notion people have that items they own are more 
169 See Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 567-68 
(elaborating on the personhood perspective of property established in Margaret Jane 
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982)). 
170 See Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 53, at 783-84. 
171 See In re McDowell, 345 N.Y.S.2d 828, 830 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1973). 
172 See Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 567-68. 
173 See id. at 558 (referencing Meir Dan-Cohen, The Value of Ownership,
GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, at 1 (2001)). Consider the additional value in being a 
homeowner, rather than a renter with otherwise comparable rights to the property. See
Asper, supra note 11, at 491 (“Subjective value in the home results from the personal 
dignity and social status that accompany homeownership, as well as the sentimental 
value an individual places on the home and surrounding land.”). 
174 See Owen D. Jones & Sarah F. Brosnan, Law, Biology, and Property: A 
New Theory of the Endowment Effect, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1935, 1942-44 (2008) 
(connecting the effect to transaction costs). Because it is based on irrationality, the 
endowment effect may be omitted from fairness analyses. But cf. Cass R. Sunstein, 
Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1150-53 (1986) 
(placing the endowment effect in a larger scheme of subjective economic preferences); 
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valuable than identical items they do not own.175 Essentially, 
whereas a person would not be willing to spend more than $100 
for a clock at a store, if a houseguest offered to buy the 
homeowner’s clock, the lowest price the homeowner would be 
willing to sell it for would be much higher than $100.176
A fourth reason an owner’s value of property would be 
higher than market price is that the owner may have a unique 
skill or ability that allows him to derive utility from the 
property others cannot.177 If Ben is one of the only people who 
knows how to play the paixiao178 (a type of Chinese panpipe last 
popular during the Song Dynasty),179 he can gain usefulness 
from it that others cannot. He will therefore value the paixiao 
more highly than the market would, since it cannot extract 
similar utility.180 For the same reason, a company holding the 
only license to mine uranium will be, by virtue of the state-
sanctioned monopoly, the only entity allowed to generate the 
greatest use out of uranium-rich land, and will therefore value 
the land more highly than would the market.  
Finally, a person may have invested a great deal of time 
and effort learning how to use a particular irreplaceable object 
to its greatest effectiveness; if the object were lost or destroyed, 
he would have to reinvest the same amount of time and effort 
to learn how to use a replacement object just as well.181 For 
instance, Adam may have spent years getting used to the 
nuances of his baseball glove, which now conforms and 
responds perfectly to his hand. If he had to use a new glove, he 
would have to spend just as long readjusting both the glove and 
see also Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 67 
(2005). Hockett here provides a nuanced discussion of the endowment effect in a 
broader analysis of property entitlements, finding the endowment effect, and similar 
notions of ownership, to be consonant with, and even deeply entrenched in, the 
American vision of property rights. Id. at 57-74. 
175 See Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 568-69. For 
a game-theoretic discussion of the endowment effect in the context of Calabresi-
Melamed property and liability rules, see Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 9, at 250-57. 
176 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 9, at 250-51. 
177 See Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 568. 
178 Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky use the example of the 
harpsichord. See id. at 568. Though the skills necessary to extract utility from the 
harpsichord seem too transferable to be rhetorically effective here. 
179 See Paixiao, BRITANICA.COM, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 
1233465/paixiao (last visited Nov. 2, 2010). 
180 See Bell & Parchomovsky, Theory of Property, supra note 2, at 568. 
181 See id. at 569 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 95-
96 (5th ed. 1998)). 
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himself to use it as well as he had used his old glove.182 Thus, 
Adam factors in the time and effort invested in learning how to 
use his glove into his valuation of it183 and will discount that 
investment in the cost of continuing to use the glove.184 The 
market has not made the same investment, and will therefore 
value his glove at a lower price.185
By compensating owners with mere market value, 
forced sale harms those who have subjective ties to the 
property.186 Some courts in partition actions have taken 
sentimental attachment into consideration,187 although often 
only as one factor among many rather than as dispositive.188
Because partition is an equitable remedy,189 courts should 
consider these types of equitable circumstances, though they 
are curiously unwilling to do so.190 Still, fair division allocation 
must consider subjective value,191 at least because it is a 
necessary component of the no-envy test.192
2. Dispossession Through Forced Sale 
Although courts are generally unwilling to entertain 
subjective concerns in partition actions, where forced sale 
would work hardship, some courts have been willing to reject 
sale in favor of partition in kind.193 Courts appear most willing 
to consider the particular hardships resulting from 
182 See id. at 568. For a more substantial example, consider a company that 
after decades of production has learned to operate a nuanced factory to utmost efficiency. 
183 See id.
184 See id. at 569 n.205 (“Where there are only close, but not identical 
substitutes, substantial costs may be involved in learning how to enjoy a substitute 
item’s full value, whereas all such costs in the currently possessed item have already 
been sunk. Consequently, the marginal cost of continuing to use the possessed item 
will no longer include the cost of learning how to use it, while such costs will continue 
to be reflected in market prices.”). 
185 See id. at 568. 
186 See Ark Land Co. v. Harper, 599 S.E.2d 754, 761 (W. Va. 2004). 
187 See id. at 760-61 (citing Schnell v. Schnell, 364 N.W.2d 713, 721 (N.D. 
1984); Fike v. Sharer, 571 P.2d 1252, 1254 (Or. 1977)). 
188 See Zimmerman v. Marsh, 618 S.E.2d 898, 901 (S.C. 2005); see also Campbell 
v. Jordan, 675 S.E.2d 801, 804 (S.C. 2009) (citing Zimmerman, 618 S.E.2d 898). 
189 See Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565, 575 (D.N.J. 1986).  
190 See 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 38.03(a)(2)(iii); 
Girard, supra note 65, at 1433. 
191 See Asper, supra note 11, at 501 (“Subjective values that can be monetized 
must be part of any compensation that is just.”). 
192 See supra Part II.B. 
193 See Wilk v. Wilk, 795 A.2d 1191, 1192 (Vt. 2002) (“Forced sale is disfavored 
because the Legislature, and the common law . . . sought to minimize the forced 
divestiture of family property where avoidable.”). 
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dispossession of a family in residence,194 and so, where a family 
will be dispossessed, a court may deny partition altogether.195
Furthermore, courts and scholars have criticized partition by 
sale for exacerbating the loss of ancestral lands (generally 
family farms) to opportunistic developers.196 In many 
particularly egregious cases, properties that had been in black 
families for generations were taken over by developers through 
forced partition, an act which scholarship suggests has been a 
major reason for the precipitous decline in black landownership 
over the last century.197 The recently published UPHPA 
attempts, in part, to prevent “unscrupulous real estate 
speculators [from] purchas[ing] a very small interest in family-
owned tenancy-in-common property with the sole purpose of 
seeking a court-ordered partition by sale,” thereby winning the 
property at auction for a price below market-value.198 At least 
one jurisdiction has enacted corrective legislation to keep 
property within families.199
3. Problems with Auctions 
Concededly, where the resource to be partitioned is 
fungible and extremely liquid, no real problems exist with 
selling the property and dividing the proceeds among the co-
owners. However, when faced with the facts of McDowell,
partition by sale does not result in a fair solution. Because the 
rocking chair has purely sentimental value, it will fetch a 
paltry sum at auction; each litigant will get half of this small 
sum, and so both will leave as losers. If the siblings could bid 
on the chair at this auction, one of them would end up as the 
194 See id. at 1195 (“Forcing partition by sale when more than one co-tenant is 
willing to take assignment of the property could result in the unnecessary forced 
divestment of numerous family farms.”). 
195 See Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565, 575 (1986) (“[Where] a family 
will be put out of its home by the sale in partition, a bill for partition will be denied.”). 
But see Heldt v. Heldt, 193 N.E.2d 7, 64-65 (Ill. 1963); see also 4 THOMPSON ON REAL 
PROPERTY, supra note 54, § 38.03(a)(1) (citing Heldt, 193 N.E.2d 7). 
196 See generally Anna Stolley Persky, In the Cross-Heirs: A Loophole in Real 
Estate Law Pits Families Against Developers and Each Other. Some Say There’s More 
Than Money at Stake, 95 A.B.A. J. 44 (2009) (discussing how “land owned for generations 
is suddenly lost” to developers and land speculators through partition sales). 
197 See generally Casagrande, supra note 56; see also UPHPA, supra note 57, 
preface & cmts.; Persky, supra note 196 (discussing how particularly African-Americans 
are displaced from “heir’s property” and how the UPHPA serves to abate the problem). 
198 UPHPA, supra note 57, prefatory notes. 
199 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-404 (2010) (providing that a minority 
shareholder party not related to other co-owners by four degrees of consanguinity 
cannot petition for partition within three years of the purchase of that interest). 
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higher bidder (because no member of the public would be 
willing to pay extra for a rocking chair that only has 
sentimental value). If x is the price the winning sibling, A, pays 
at auction, x is divided between the two, so at the end of the 
day, A will leave with the rocking chair minus x/2, and the 
other sibling, B, will leave with x/2. Here both parties leave 
with ostensibly the same net value: B with x/2, and A with the 
chair (valued at x) minus x/2. However, because of the nature of 
bidding at an auction, x does not accurately reflect winning 
bidder A’s subjective valuation of the chair; rather it simply 
reflects the price higher than which B was unwilling to spend. 
Suppose A valued the chair at $10,000 (meaning he subjectively 
valued his interest at $5000) and B valued the chair at $6000 
(meaning she subjectively valued her interest at $3000). If A
places a bid for $6000, B will be unwilling to go higher and will 
not bid; therefore A will win the chair and pay half this amount 
($3000) to B. Because A values the chair at $10,000, he values 
his final allocation at $7000 (the value of the chair minus the 
$3000 he paid to B). A therefore gains a $2000 surplus (the 
$7000 he received over the $5000 he thought his interest was 
worth) while B gains no surplus at all (since the $3000 she 
received was equal to her initial valuation). Thus, although the 
allocation satisfies the envy-free criterion, it violates 
equitability, because the surpluses are unequal. 
In a sealed-bid auction, parties submit one bid each, 
with the chair going to whomever submitted the highest 
amount (here, A’s $10,000 bid). The result in a sealed-bid 
auction is the reverse of the result in the normal auction: A
leaves with the $5000 he expected and thus with no surplus, 
but B gains a $2000 surplus over the $3000 she expected. 
The transaction costs associated with holding an 
auction200 also make this solution inefficient. When it orders a 
judicial sale, the court will normally appoint a panel of 
commissioners or a referee to conduct a public or private sale of 
the property.201 The proceeds of the sale go toward paying 
attorneys’ fees, fees for the commissioner’s appraisal, expenses 
of the auction, and other costs,202 with the remainder paid to the 
200 See generally Miller v. Burke, 68 N.Y. 615 (1877) (auctioneer recovering 
auction fees from partition sale); Anderson v. Anderson, No. A-01-418, 2002 Neb. App. 
LEXIS 180 (Neb. Ct. App. July 2, 2002) (reasonableness of auction fees as a percentage 
of sale price in partition sale). 
201 See Girard, supra note 65, at 1429-30. 
202 See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 874.010 (Deering 2010) (“The costs of partition 
include [inter alia]: . . . attorney’s fees . . . fee and expenses of the 
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parties based on their respective shares.203 With these costs 
eliminated, both parties would leave with larger shares, 
resulting in a Pareto-superior allocation. Finally, judicial sales 
notoriously yield submarket prices. For instance, following the 
Popov v. Hayashi decision, the Barry Bonds ball did not fetch 
nearly as much at auction as had been originally estimated (an 
amount, as it turns out, which was several thousand dollars 
less than Popov’s legal bill).204
E. Partition by Allotment 
The two recognized judicial methods of partition are 
partition in kind and partition by sale. However, in 30 percent 
of the states, courts have occasionally engaged in a third,205
generally unacknowledged206 method of partition known as 
partition by allotment.207 The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
defines “partition by allotment” as a mode of partition 
“whereby one joint owner is allotted the entire property” and 
pays the others for their respective interests.208 Many 
referee . . . compensation . . . for services of a surveyor or other person employed by the 
referee . . . costs of a title report . . . .”); see also Riley v. Turpin, 349 P.2d 63 (Cal. 1960). 
203 See Clement v. Ferguson, 287 P.2d 207, 213-14 (Okla. 1955). 
204 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 5, at 111. 
205 Variations on partition by allotment may avoid its characterization as 
something separate from partition by sale or in kind. For instance, in an in kind 
division with an owelty payment, it is conceivable that the property be physically 
divided into one part containing the entire property and the other containing nothing. 
Furthermore, the winning bidder at a partition sale may be one of the co-owners. 
206 The term “partition by allotment” has no entry in American Jurisprudence,
American Law Reports, Corpus Juris Secundum, Black’s Law Dictionary, Ballentine’s 
Law Dictionary, or Words and Phrases, and is not mentioned in the Restatement (First) 
of Property. Confusingly, the term is sometimes used to refer to partition in kind. See, 
e.g., Wilk v. Wilk, 795 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Vt. 2002). 
207 In Maine it is referred to as “partition by buy-out,” see Libby v. Lorrain, 
430 A.2d 37, 39-40 (Me. 1981), and in Vermont it is referred to as “assignment,” see
Wilk, 795 A.2d at 1193 (“When . . . the real estate . . . cannot be divided without great 
inconvenience . . . the court may order it assigned to one of the parties, provided he 
pays to the other . . . such sum . . . as the commissioners judge equitable.” (quoting VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5174)). 
208 Zimmerman v. Marsh, 618 S.E.2d 898, 901 (S.C. 2005); see also id. at 902 
(Peleicones, J., dissenting); Pruitt v. Pruitt, 380 S.E.2d 862, 864 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) 
(“Partition by allotment to one of the parties”); see also Austin v. Dobbins, 252 S.E.2d 
588, 590-91 (Va. 1979) (Virginia’s statute “expressly authorizes partition by allotment 
of the whole property to one or more coparceners . . . or to a tenant in common”); Faith 
Rivers, Inequity in Equity: The Tragedy of Tenancy in Common for Heirs’ Property 
Owners Facing Partition in Equity, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 59, 72-73 
(2007) (“Where one cotenant seeks to maintain the real property, a court may utilize 
partition by allotment to allow one cotenant to buy out other cotenants through 
payment of the appraised value.” (citing Zimmerman, 618 S.E.2d at 900)). 
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jurisdictions do not permit this mode of partition.209 Thirteen 
states, however, recognize partition by allotment under 
statute.210 Courts in two states allow partition by allotment 
209 See, e.g., Thompson v. Celestain, 936 So.2d 219, 222 (La. Ct. App. 2006) 
(holding the property must be sold publicly, and that assigning the property to one of 
the parties was in error); Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 307 A.2d 710, 712 (Md. 1973) 
(holding partition with owelty does not allow dispossessing but reimbursing some co-
owners); see also Zimmerman, 618 S.E.2d at 902 (Peleicones, J., dissenting); see also
Soriano v. Soriano, 643 P.2d 450, 452 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (in a divorce proceeding, 
court violated statutory duty by providing for a private auction where “the husband 
and wife [were] the only persons permitted to bid and that each item subject to auction 
be awarded to the person submitting the highest bid on that item”). But see Dougherty 
v. Dougherty, 210 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (divorce court’s use of sealed 
bids in lieu of partition was not abuse of discretion). 
210 See Alabama: ALA. CODE § 35-6-100 (LexisNexis 2010); Prince v. Hunter, 
388 So. 2d 546, 547 (Ala. 1980) (sale reversed because statute mandates joint owners 
be given opportunity to purchase other owners’ shares). But see Jolly v. Knopf, 463 So. 
2d 150 (Ala. 1985) (challenging the statute’s constitutionality). Georgia: GA. CODE ANN.
§ 44-6-166.1 (2010) (allowing parties to buy out others’ shares at appraised price); 
Lassiter Props. v. Gresham, 371 S.E.2d 650, 651 (Ga. 1988) (holding that statute allows 
party to purchase others’ shares to avoid sale); Clements v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 
124 S.E. 516, 517 (Ga. 1924) (where three railroads owned depot as tenants in common, 
court ordered value of the property be set and defendants be given opportunity to buy 
plaintiff’s share). Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6515 (2010) (“When any 
parcel . . . is of greater value than either party’s share and cannot be divided without 
great inconvenience, it may be assigned to one party by his paying the sum of money 
awarded to the parties who have less than their shares.”); Libby v. Lorrain, 430 A.2d 
37, 39-40 (Me. 1981) (holding “partition by buy-out” is permitted, but inappropriate 
where the party requesting the allotment failed to show she had the financial ability to 
pay); Dyer v. Lowell, 30 Me. 217, 219 (1849) (“[I]f the estate was incapable of division, 
[the court] should have set off the whole to one of the co-tenants” under the statute.). 
Maryland: Catlin v. Catlin, 60 Md. 573 (1883) (under statute, eldest heir of intestate 
descendant may elect to take entire estate and pay to the other heirs their 
proportionate shares). But see Onderdonk, 307 A.2d at 712 (concept of owelty does not 
allow partition dispossessing but reimbursing co-owners). Minnesota: MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 558.12 (West 2010) (With a “tenement which cannot be divided . . . the whole 
premises . . . may be set off to any party who will accept it . . . paying to . . . the others 
such sums . . . as the referees award.”); Cozzi v. Cozzi, 391 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986). Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5307.09 (LexisNexis 2004) (“[I]f one or more 
of the parties elects to take the estate at the [commissioners’] appraised value, it shall 
be adjudged to them, upon their paying to the other parties their proportion of its 
appraised value.”); Sword v. Sword, 620 N.E.2d 199, 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (a party 
may elect to take estate at appraised value). Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 1512 (West 2010) (“If partition cannot be made, and the property shall have 
been . . . appraised, any one . . . of the parties may elect to take . . . at the 
appraisement . . . on payment . . . of their proportion of the appraised value.”); Sun Inv. 
& Loan Corp. v. McIntyre, 537 P.2d 341, 344 (Okla. 1975); Herron Trust v. Swarts, 361 
P.2d 280 (Okla. 1961). Pennsylvania: 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1563 (West 2002) 
(party objecting to sale may be awarded the property and pay parties requesting 
partition and sale the amounts of their interests based upon the court’s valuation); 
Beall v. Hare, 174 A.2d 847, 849 (Pa. 1961); cf. Harbin v. Harde, 14 A.2d 866, 867 (Pa. 
1940) (deciding under an older statute). South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-61-25 
(2009); Zimmerman, 618 S.E.2d at 901; Cox v. Frierson, 451 S.E.2d 392, 393 (S.C. 
1994) (per curium) (reversing sale because referee ordered sale without first 
considering partition by allotment). Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 5174 (2002) 
(“When . . . the real estate . . . cannot be divided . . . the court may order it assigned to 
one of the parties, provided he pays to the other party such sum . . . as the 
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even in the absence of statutory authority.211 Five states 
explicitly prefer partition by allotment to partition by sale, and 
thus courts may hold sale improper if allotment is not first 
considered.212 The Uniform Probate Code section 3-911,213
adopted by seventeen states,214 allows a court to sell estate 
“property which cannot be partitioned without prejudice to the 
commissioners judge equitable.”); Wilk, 795 A.2d at 1194 (holding under statute, 
partition in kind is preferred over partition by allotment, and allotment preferred over 
partition by sale). Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-83 (2010) (“When partition cannot be 
conveniently made, the entire subject may be allotted to any one or more of the 
parties.”); Quillen v. Tull, 312 S.E.2d 278, 281 (Va. 1984); Austin, 252 S.E.2d at 590-91 
(statute “expressly authorizes partition by allotment of the whole property to one or 
more coparceners . . . or to a tenant in common”); Price v. Simpson, 29 S.E.2d 394, 396 
(Va. 1944); Roberts v. Hagan, 93 S.E. 619, 621 (Va. 1917) (under statute “it would have 
been entirely within the power of the court . . . to have assigned to [Plaintiff] the entire 
estate to be partitioned, upon his payment to [Defendant] of the amount to which she 
would be entitled for her interest”). West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-4-3 
(LexisNexis 2005) (“When partition cannot be conveniently made, the entire subject 
may be allotted to any party.”); State ex rel. Bowser v. Hill, 550 S.E.2d 62, 65-66 (W. 
Va. 2001) (discussing Corrothers v. Jolliffe, 9 S.E. 889 (W. Va. 1899)); Smith v. Smith, 
376 S.E.2d 97, 102 (W. Va. 1988) (allowing the allotment of the entire property, with 
payment based on appraised value of a panel of “three disinterested and qualified 
persons”); Corrothers, 9 S.E. at 890 (by statute, “when partition in kind cannot be 
conveniently made, the court may . . . allot the entire subject to a party . . . . who offers 
the largest proportional price for it”). Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-32-109 (2011) 
(“When . . . the estate cannot be divided . . . without manifest injury . . . and one . . . of 
the parties elects to take the estate at [the commissioners’] appraised value, it shall be 
adjudged to him upon his paying to the other parties their proportion of the appraised 
value.”); Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 85 P.3d 1010, 1013 (Wyo. 2004); In re
Estate of Sorenson, 9 P.3d 259, 262 (Wyo. 2000). 
211 See Morris v. Tracy, 48 P. 571, 572-73 (Kan. 1897) (where commissioners 
report that partition in kind cannot be made without manifest injury, it was error to 
direct a sale of the property without first allowing one or more of the parties to take the 
land at the appraised value); Reitmeier v. Kalinoski, 631 F. Supp. 565, 578 (D.N.J. 
1986) (predicting that New Jersey “would permit a partition in which one party took 
the entire property and compensated the other with an owelty”); Baker v. Drabik, 541 
A.2d 229, 232-33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (analyzing Reitmeier, 631 F. Supp. 
565, and holding party may purchase the other’s interest at its fair market value). 
212 See Prince, 388 So. 2d at 547 (order of sale reversed because Alabama 
statute mandates joint owners be given opportunity to purchase other owners’ shares); 
Dyer, 30 Me. at 219 (“If the estate was incapable of division, they should have set off 
the whole to one of the co-tenants” according to Maine statute); Morris, 48 P. at 573 
(holding it was error to direct a sale of the property without first allowing one or more 
of the parties to take the land at the appraised value); Cox, 451 S.E.2d at 393 (per 
curium) (reversing order for judicial sale because referee ordered the sale without first 
considering partition by allotment); Wilk, 795 A.2d at 1194 (under statute, partition in 
kind is preferred over partition by allotment, and partition by allotment is preferred 
over partition by sale). 
213 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-911 (2010). 
214 See Acts: Probate Code, UNIFORM LAW COMM’N, http://www.nccusl.org/ 
Act.aspx?title=Probate%20Code (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (legislative tracking and 
enactment status map). The Virgin Islands has also adopted the UPC. See id. Although 
Florida and the District of Columbia have not officially adopted the UPC, they have 
substantially similar statutes. Compare UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-911 (2010), with FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 733.814 (West 2010), and D.C. CODE § 20-1105 (LexisNexis 2001). 
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owners and which cannot conveniently be allotted to any one 
party.”215 Additionally, the UPHPA requires that courts allow 
the co-owners who did not request partition by sale to buy the 
interests of those cotenants who did request sale at a price 
based on the initial appraisal valuation of the property.216
Under most, if not all, such allotment schemes, the price 
for which a party may purchase the other owners’ interests is 
set objectively ex ante, usually by a panel of three 
commissioners charged with appraising the property.217 Because 
of commissioners’ and surveyors’ appraisal fees, the resulting 
allocation cannot be Pareto-optimal. Also, if the appraised 
value is too low (that is, lower than the parties’ subjective 
value), then more than one party will be willing to take the 
property.218 A Pennsylvania court ruled that where both parties 
were willing to take the property at valuation, it was proper to 
have the parties submit sealed bids and allot the property to 
the highest bidder.219 Vermont “allows for assignment even 
when more than one co-tenant is willing to accept it, and gives 
the trial court discretion over whether to order an assignment 
and the choice of assignee.”220
215 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-911 (2010) (emphasis added). 
216 See UPHPA, supra note 57, § 7 & accompanying cmts. 
217 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-6-166.1 (2010) (at appraised price); Clements 
v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 124 S.E. 516, 517 (Ga. 1924) (at a value set by the court); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 558.12 (West 2010) (“such sums of money as the referees award”); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5307.09 (LexisNexis 2004) (“paying . . . their proportion of [the 
commissioners’] appraised value”); Sword v. Sword, 620 N.E.2d 199, 204 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1993) (at appraised value); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1512 (West 2010) 
(“payment . . . of their proportion of the appraised value”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1563 (West 2002) (amounts based upon the court’s valuation); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, 
§ 5174 (2002) (“pays . . . such sum of money . . . as the commissioners judge equitable”); 
Smith v. Smith, 376 S.E.2d 97, 102 (W. Va. 1988) (payment based on the appraised 
value by a panel of “three disinterested and qualified persons”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
32-109 (2011) (“paying . . . their proportion of the [commissioners’] appraised value 
according to their respective rights”); Morris v. Tracy, 48 P. 571 (Kan. 1897) (take at 
the appraised value); Baker v. Drabik, 541 A.2d 229 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1988) 
(purchase the other’s interest at fair market value). But see Corrothers v. Jolliffe, 9 
S.E. 889, 890 (W. Va. 1899) (“[T]he court may . . . allot the entire subject to a 
party . . . . who offers the largest proportional price for it . . . .”). 
218 Clearly valuation was set too low in these instances. 
219 See Harbin v. Harde, 14 A.2d 866, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1940) (so holding, 
even though the party with the losing bid inherited his share and the winner bought 
her interest from other heirs).  
220 See Wilk v. Wilk, 795 A.2d 1191, 1196 (Vt. 2002) (holding no abuse of 
discretion where court ordered 1/8 owning brother with adjacent junkyard to transfer 
his share to 7/8 owning brother operating a paving business on the property, where 
both brothers were willing to take the property at valuation). 
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Table 1: Partition by Allotment
The allocation resulting from partition by allotment is 
not necessarily proportional, equitable, or envy-free. Say Amy 
and Bruce are partitioning a painting, p, created by Amy’s 
grandfather, a famous artist. The market value (M) of the 
painting is $70,000. Because of its sentimental value, Amy’s 
valuation (VA) of the painting is $100,000. Bruce, on the other 
hand, because of the delight in owning a genuine masterpiece 
and the endowment effect, values the painting at VB, $80,000. 
Thus, Amy values her half interest at $50,000 and Bruce 
values his half interest at $40,000. However, because the 
market value is $70,000, the objective value of each of their 
interests is only $35,000, and so the owelty is set at that 
amount. Under their state’s allotment statute, Amy buys 
Bruce’s interest in the painting for $35,000 and gets full 
ownership of it. 
Table 2: Amy and Bruce
The allocation fails the no-envy test because Bruce sees 
Amy’s allocation as more valuable than his own. Since he 
values the painting at $80,000, to him Amy’s allocation is 
worth $45,000, (which of course is greater than the $35,000 he 
received in cash), and so Bruce would rather have her 
allocation. Additionally, the allocation is not proportional 
because Bruce expected to get at least $40,000 (the subjective 
value of his interest) but left with $35,000. Finally, the 
allocation is not equitable because Amy’s surplus is not equal 






































































Amy $100,000 $50,000 
$70,000 $35,000 
p -
$35,000 $65,000 $35,000 +$15,000 
Bruce $80,000 $40,000 $35,000 $35,000 $45,000 - $5000 
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many of the normative criteria of fair division, but it cannot 
guarantee fulfilling most or all of them. 
A slightly different scenario demonstrates that in 
partition by allotment the surplus values will always be 
different unless the owelty is equal to the average of the initial 
subjective evaluations. Say Cody and Daron buy a house, 
Blackacre, expecting to move in together. Things fall apart; 
Daron moves to the next town, but Cody continues to occupy 
the house, both living and operating a profitable orthodontics 
practice there. A year later, Daron is in need of cash and brings 
an action for partition of Blackacre, now valued at $90,000. 
Daron is only interested in the money and would be happy to 
get half of whatever Blackacre is worth on the open market. 
Cody, on the other hand, having an established reputation in 
the community, does not want to move and so values retaining 
Blackacre at $120,000.  
Table 3: Cody and Daron
Here the allocation is nonenvious, because neither party 
prefers the other’s allocation, and it is proportional, because 
each party receives at least half of their value of the property. 
However, it is not equitable, because Cody’s surplus is larger 
than Daron’s. Also, because of court costs, both parties actually 
leave with a little less, thereby making the distribution 
inefficient. 
IV. EQUITABLE ALLOTMENT
The main problem with partition by allotment is that it 
uses market value to set the payment price. If market value were 
eliminated from the equation and replaced with an owelty 
determined from the parties’ subjective valuations of the resource, 
the method can be reformulated221 to assure a proportional, envy-
221 As a variation of partition by allotment, equitable allotment may be 
allowable under a state’s partition statutes or rules without necessity of further 
legislation. See supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text. 
Subjective 





















$75,000 $45,000 +$15,000 
Daron $90,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $45,000 $0 
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free, efficient, and equitable allocation. This reformulated method 
will be referred to here as equitable allotment. 
A. The Method: Overview 
Equitable allotment is a fair and efficient partition 
method for two-party disputes over a single indivisible resource 
(r). Under this method, the parties submit sealed bids with their 
subjective valuations of the resource. The buyout price, (w), is 
half the average of these two amounts. The party submitting the 
highest bid will be allotted the entire resource and will pay to 
the other the predetermined owelty (the buyout price).222
Equitable allotment is a simplified version of Knaster’s 
procedure of sealed bids,223 which, when dividing multiple 
indivisible goods among several parties, guarantees 
proportionality but not envy-freeness. However, with only two 
parties, the result is always envy-free.224 When Knaster’s 
procedure is performed for two parties and one item, it is 
exactly the same as equitable allotment.225
Table 4: Equitable Allotment
222 To demonstrate that the allocation is truly envy-free, the court may give 
one of the parties the choice between either taking the resource or taking the payment. 
But regardless of who chooses, the party submitting the higher bid will end up with r,
paying w to the party submitting the lower bid. This is because, to the party 
submitting the lower bid, the cash is the more valuable of the two choices. On the other 
hand, to the party submitting the higher bid, r-w is more valuable than w, and so he 
will gladly pay the buyout price to have the resource. The prospect of not knowing who 
the chooser will be may, however, give even greater incentive for honest initial 
evaluation. This, of course, assumes that both parties will act rationally, and strive to 
maximize their own wealth. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 9, at 228 (“The standard 
economic game-theoretic prediction is that both players will behave rationally, that is 
to say, strive to maximize their monetary payoffs.”). 
223 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 52-56; see also
Steinhaus, supra note 14 (first describing Knaster’s procedure). 
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Table 5: Equitable Allotment Showing Inherent  
Values for r and w
B. Setting the Owelty 
Equitable allotment finds the proper value for r by 
averaging the two parties’ subjective values (Vb and Vs). If the 
parties have equal half-interests then the value of each interest 
(and hence the owelty value) is half of this average. If the parties 
have unequal interests in the property, the owelty can simply be 
adjusted for each party to reflect the ratio of their interests.  
Whether the parties value r equally or differently, the 
owelty value arrived at will reflect the proper value of r. Unless 
the litigants are not reasonable people, their bid amounts will 
very closely approximate the proper value they attach to the 
resource. Neither will want to pay more than he has to, and 
neither will want to give up the item for a lower sum than 
necessary. Because neither knows the other’s bid, both will have 
great incentive to arrive at a figure they perceive as the proper 
value of the property. In that case, one party leaves with the 
property, and the other leaves with the fair value of his interest. 
Equitable allotment is “equitable” because it assures 
that each party’s surplus is the same. Unlike in an auction, 













































































Table 5 shows that the allocations and surplus values are identical for both the 
buyer and seller.
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partition by allotment, where neither party determines the 
price, in equitable allotment, the subjective values of both 
parties determine the buy-out price. By basing the owelty 
payment on the average of the parties’ subjective values, 
equitable allotment guarantees that the difference between 
each party’s final allotment and their proportional share is 
equal, even if the parties value r differently. Thus, in equitable 
allotment, the amount by which each party feels her allocation 
exceeds the value of her interest will always be the same. 
C. Efficiency 
By keeping the resource intact, both physically and 
temporally, equitable allotment maximizes the overall 
allocation. However, it need not be used solely for indivisible 
resources. The equitable allotment method works just as well 
for property that could also have been divided physically and 
for resources that are liquid or fungible. More significantly, 
without the need for an objective appraisal of the property, 
both parties save on court costs, yielding a Pareto-superior 
outcome. In fact, the parties can bypass the judicial procedure 
altogether, because all equitable allotment requires is both 
parties together in a room with two pieces of paper and a pen. 
Furthermore, because this method always gives the resource to 
the party that values it the most, it satisfies the requirement of 
fitness.  
D. Application 
Consider how equitable allotment would be applied in a 
McDowell-like situation. In this scenario, Ethel and Frank both 
want their grandfather’s old rocking chair (c), which would sell 
on eBay for at most $150. Ethel has very fond memories of her 
grandfather reading to her in the chair and would pay up to 
$8000 to have it and be able to pass it on to her children. Frank 
also has sentimental attachment to the chair, but finds it 
somewhat uncomfortable to sit in, so he would pay up to $6000 
to keep it.  
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Table 6: Ethel and Frank
If Ethel submits a bid of $8000 and Frank submits a bid 
of $6000, the average of the bids is $7000, so the owelty will be 
set at $3500. Because Ethel submitted the highest bid, she will 
be allotted the chair and be ordered to pay Frank $3500. Ethel 
views the total value of her allocation at $4500 and so is not 
envious of Frank’s $3500 award. And from Frank’s perspective 
Ethel’s allocation is only worth $2500, so he is happier with his 
payment and is not envious of her allocation. 
The facts of Pugh v. NPC Services, Inc.226 present a 
unique circumstance where equitable allotment would have 
helped the court reach a more efficient and fair outcome. In 
that case, the court was confounded227 when, because of 
hazardous waste contamination, the indivisible subject 
property had either “no value or a negative value.”228 What the 
court did not realize was that the value to the parties—and the 
apparent reason for the partition action—was to divest 
themselves of the contaminated land. Therefore, equitable 
allotment should apportion this divestiture.  
Using equitable allotment in this situation, the question 
each party should be asked is, “What is it worth to you to step 
away from this mess?” The answer to this will be based on 
what each party estimates it will cost them to clean up the 
waste, as well as what the underlying property would be worth 
to them if the waste were cleaned up. The party submitting the 
higher bid would be allotted the right to step away, while the 
party submitting the lower bid would be awarded the owelty 
but would remain with the property. 
E. Bidding Strategy  
There are several limitations to equitable allotment, one 
of which is its susceptibility to gamesmanship. However, in the 
226 Pugh v. NPC Servs., Inc., 721 So. 2d 1056 (La. Ct. App. 1998). 
227 After asking, “How can property that is susceptible to neither division in kind 
















Ethel $8000 $4000 
$150 $3500 
c-$3500 $4500 $3500 +$500 
Frank $6000 $3000 $3500 $3500 $2500 +$500 
300 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1
overwhelming majority of situations, this flaw is not fatal since 
gamesmanship is prohibitively risky. Recall Ethel and Frank’s 
partition of their rocking chair. Ethel knows that in equitable 
allotment, the chair goes to the person who submits the highest 
bid, so her initial strategy is to bid high. But then she 
remembers that the higher she bids, the more she will have to 
pay. Frank reflects on his reserve price and suspects his sister 
will probably be willing to pay somewhat more than he would, 
considering he knows how fond she is of the chair. His initial 
strategy then is to raise his bid just enough that Ethel will get 
the chair and pay him more than she would have otherwise for 
his interest. However, this strategy is very risky; he does not 
know exactly what Ethel’s subjective valuation is, so if he 
raises his bid too much, he will get the chair and overpay for it. 
The opposite is going through Ethel’s head: she suspects her 
bid is greater than her brother’s, so if she lowers her valuation 
just enough, she can still end up with the chair but pay less for 
it than she would otherwise. Again, this too is risky because if 
she lowers her bid too much, she will lose the chair and get a 
paltry sum in compensation. 
This shows how equitable allotment is not strategy-proof, 
but if the parties’ valuations are greater than the market price, 
gamesmanship is very risky.229 If the players reveal their 
strategy, the entire method falls apart. This will most likely 
happen if one of the parties makes known he is only interested 
in the market value.  
Another problem with equitable allotment is that it is 
unavailable if at least one of the parties cannot pay the owelty. 
Unlike with chance, rotation, partition in kind and by sale, the 
parties must have enough money to cover the owelty in order to 
participate in equitable allotment (or partition by allotment).230
If a party’s only asset is the resource being partitioned, 
equitable allotment is not possible. 
229 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 56. Discussing 
strategic misrepresentation in Knaster’s procedure, the authors conclude that while 
the procedure is not strategy-proof, because of the high risk of misrepresentation 
“honest evaluations, in many situations . . . may be the pragmatic thing to do.” Id.
(quoting HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 296 (1982)). Cf. 
Fragnelli & Marina, supra note 114. 
230 See BRAMS & TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION, supra note 17, at 56. 
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CONCLUSION
Although centuries old, American partition law has not 
developed the subtleties of contract or tort law. Instead, the 
laws of partition have developed haphazardly and bluntly, and 
so co-owners are left with only a few narrow options. The 
problem with the available methods is that the courts are so 
focused on the fairest solution that they fail to use a solution 
that is both fair and efficient.231 On the other hand, economists 
often focus solely on efficiency, and leave fairness 
considerations to other disciplines.232 Instead of being beholden 
to the old rules of partition, courts should use economic 
theories to fairly and efficiently allocate resources. Of course, 
reality is more complex than theory, and in the real world, 
there are often factors in family disputes or divorces that defy 
simplistic mathematics. There are no easy solutions.233 The goal 
of this note, therefore, is to spark debate about judicial 
partition schemes, and encourage an economic approach to 
partition that takes subjective value into consideration. 
Zachary D. Kuperman†
231 See Blonquist v. Frandsen, 694 P.2d 595, 596 (Utah 1984) (noting “the 
fundamental objective in a partition action is to divide the property so as to be fair and 
equitable and confer no unfair advantage on any of the cotenants”); see also ZAJAC,
supra note 88, at 69 (explaining that “at best, economic efficiency is a necessary but far 
from sufficient condition for an economically just or fair economy”). 
232 See ZAJAC, supra note 88, at 76. 
233 See Meurer, supra note 13, at 940 (writing that economists insist “there is 
no single fair method of division”). 
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